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This paper analyzes, firstly, the expected effects of social security reforms that have been implement-
ed in Spain after 2004 (and, secondly, the expected effects of reductions in the minimum pension) on
retirement decision and human capital accumulation (and hence on growth and on income inequality).
Individuals in our model economy differ in their innate ability and growth is a by-product of the most
skilled individuals’ productivity. According to our model, i) increases in the minimum and normal re-
tirement ages are expected to have a strong effect, not only on individuals’ retirement decisions, but
also on their education investment; ii) augmented incentives to late retirement are not expected to have
any effect; iii) reductions in the minimum pension are not expected to have a significant effect unless
it is completely eliminated.
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1. Introduction
A great deal of literature has analyzed the effect of pay-as-you-go social security on
workers’ voluntary retirement age. The available empirical evidence suggests that, at least
for the US economy, social security is relevant for retirement age issues, despite the lack of
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Bilbao (Spain). Tel. (34) 94.601.3785 Fax. (34) 94.601.7123. E-mail address: amaia.iza@ehu.estotal agreement on the effect of changes in the payout from the social security program. (See,
e.g., Diamond et al., 1997, Coile et al., 2000, Fabel, 1994, Fenge and Pestieau, 2005, Kalem-
li-Ozcan, 2002.).
However, very few papers study the effect of a minimum pension upon workers’ volun-
tary retirement age. For instance, according to the calculations in Jim￩nez-Mart￭n and
S￡nchez-Mart￭n (2007) and S￡nchez (2010) on the role of minimum pensions in postponing
early retirement in Spain, total early retirement was almost 50% larger with minimum pen-
sions. As they were considering an exogenous growth model, they could not, of course, an-
alyze the effect of minimum (or maximum) pensions on growth.
Some papers have explored the impact of a pay-as-you-go social security system on
human capital investment incentives, and hence on endogenous growth. For instance,
Echevarr￭a and Iza (2006) obtained a discouraging effect of the size of social security on
human capital accumulation and retirement age. Furthermore, the relationship between the
size of social security and the per capita GDP growth rate that they found was mostly nega-
tive, except for very low values for the social security contribution rate. The explanation lies
in the discouraging effect that social security imposes on education and, in particular, retire-
ment age, which causes a fall in the share of the working population in the economy. How-
ever, they did not consider the effect of minimum (or maximum) pensions on education and
growth.
In this paper, we focus on the effects of a minimum pension payment in a pay-as-you-
go social security system on human capital (education) investment incentives, and hence, on
growth and income inequality. Additionally, retirement age is endogenously determined, so
we also analyze the effects of pension policies on early retirement incentives. We build up a
two-period, OLG model economy in which pension benefits are earnings-related and popu-
lated by ex ante heterogeneous individuals who differ in their innate (learning) ability.
Individuals in their first period of life choose their level of education. Those born with
higher ability are expected to invest more in their education. Assuming [which is the case,
among others, of the Spanish social security system] that pension payments are earnings-re-
lated, the return on human capital investment is not constrained to labor income while work-
ing, but in fact extends to pensions during retirement1. Therefore, when individuals choose
their optimal level of education, they take into account not only the effect on future labor
earnings, but also on future pension benefits. Consequently, social security introduces an in-
centive for higher investment in human capital2.
This incentive, however, might break down because the pension scheme includes a min-
imum pension payment3. For instance, as the minimum pension increases, so does the thresh-
old for the innate ability for which individuals end up receiving the minimum pension. Min-
imum pensions, therefore, have a discouraging effect on education investment for those
individuals with sufficiently low innate ability. In their second period, individuals supply
labor elastically (i.e. optimally choose their retirement age). Therefore, voluntary retirement
10 CRUZ A. ECHEVARRￍA AND AMAIA IZAage also depends on the incentives embedded in the public pension system: not only mini-
mum pensions, but also penalties for early retirement which take the form of reductions in
the net pension payment if retirement occurs before normal retirement age, and the incen-
tives for retiring after normal retirement age. Minimum pensions work in the opposite direc-
tion to penalties and incentives as they promote early retirement. In short, social security in
this economy influences both the size of the working population in the economy and its pro-
ductivity.
We calibrate the model and construct a benchmark case which fairly reproduces some
stylized facts of the Spanish economy in 2004. Starting from this baseline case, firstly, we
solve for a new balanced growth path economy taking into account social security policies
already in place or projected to be implemented in the near future (higher minimum and nor-
mal retirement ages and higher incentives to late retirement). We analyze their effects on re-
tirement, education investment (and hence, on internal rate of return of the pension system,
income inequality and growth) under two scenarios: i) assuming the same educational distri-
bution of workers and dependency ratio as observed in 2004, and ii) considering a new sta-
tionary educational distribution of workers and dependency ratio to which the Spanish econ-
omy is expected to converge by 2050. Thirdly, we analyze the effects of reductions in the
minimum retirement pension benefits under the above mentioned two scenarios. Our main
results follow:
I. Our model predicts that more skilled individuals enjoy a higher return on their in-
vestment in education and, consequently, spend more on education.
II. The existence of a minimum pension, however, may reduce low skill individuals’
incentives to invest in human capital.
III. Increases in the minimum and normal retirement ages are expected to have a strong
effect, not only on individuals’ retirement decisions, but also on their education in-
vestment.
IV. Augmented incentives to late retirement are not expected to have any effect.
V. Reductions in the minimum pension are not expected to have a significant effect un-
less it is completely eliminated.
VI. Policies enhancing human capital investment for the cleverest workers increase
growth as a by-product of these workers’ productivity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the economy. The calibration and
the corresponding numerical exercise are carried out in Section 3. Section 4 presents the con-
clusions. A mathematical Appendix is included at the end.
2 The economy
This economy is characterized by the behavior of households and firms which act in per-
fectly competitive markets for one unique (aggregate) commodity and two production fac-
tors (physical capital and human capital) in the presence of social security. Time is discrete.
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At any time t this economy is populated by two overlapping generations of individuals,
young and old. Individuals consume both when young and old, and supply inelastically one
unit of labor when young. In their second period, however, individuals choose their optimal
leisure consumption: higher leisure consumption is interpreted as workers choosing to retire
earlier4. Second period leisure is modeled as a continuous variable choice, bounded both
above and below, so that a whole range of intermediate choices is possible. A similar setup
is used in Garriga and Manresa (1999).
Additionally, individuals in their first period must choose their optimal level of educa-
tion: this choice will affect not only their labor income, but also their retirement pension ben-
efits. This is so because we assume that i) social security is non-funded, and ii) pensions are
earnings-related (and, therefore, defined-benefit type).
We assume one unique source of heterogeneity among individuals. Thus, we assume
that there are four types of individuals (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) who differ by their innate ability, ʸi
(where ʸ1 < ʸ2 < ʸ3 < ʸ4): higher innate ability means higher learning ability and higher re-
turn on investment in human capital and, therefore, higher education expenditure in princi-
ple (which, in turn, implies higher economic growth). Types 1, 2, 3 and 4 represent individ-
uals with no primary studies, individuals attaining primary, secondary (high school) and
college education, respectively.
This heterogeneity drives the income inequality in this economy, partially mitigated by
the social security system5. As will be seen, the existence of minimum pension benefits,
along with the earnings-related nature of pension benefits, might pose an incentive problem:
low-skill individuals might find it optimal to reduce their investment in education for a suf-
ficiently high minimum retirement pension. The preferences of an i-th type individual born
at time t are represented by the utility function
[1]




o,t+1 denote first period and second period





U] denotes second period leisure. We assume that second period leisure
is bounded below (￿
L > 0), i.e. workers are legally forced to retire at some time before a max-
imum age; and, also, bounded above (￿
U < 1), i.e. a minimum retirement age exists6. Whenev-
er an individual choice variable is affected by two subscripts, the first one denotes the individ-
ual’s age (y for young and o for old, respectively), and the second one denotes calendar time.
We assume the productivity level, h
i
t, this individual attains is a function of his/her in-
nate ability, ʸi, and his/her expenditure on education, e
i
t, once normalized by the total factor
productivity at time t, At. More precisely, we assume that
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As in Bouzahzah, De la Croix and Docquier (2002) [BDD hereafter], the engine of
growth of this economy will be given by the aggregate state of knowledge in the economy.
Even though our model is very close to the one in BDD, the way in which we separate the in-
dividual human capital level from the state of knowledge is in fact closer to Romer (1990), as
we distinguish between the private knowledge attained by an individual who lives a finite life,
h
i
t, and the non-rival knowledge of the economy which can be accumulated indefinitely, At.
Education expenditure is normalized by the state of knowledge in Eq. (2) in order to ob-
tain a balanced growth path of the economy along which the wage (per unit of labor) grows
at the same rate as the total factor productivity, At. Therefore, the expenditure on education
will increase at the same rate as At, and all individuals of type i will spend a constant share
of their income on education, so that both e
i
t / At and h
i
t remain constant too; and the total
productivity will be h
i
tAt, growing at the same rate as At.
A major difference between our model and the one in BDD is that investment in educa-
tion comes from income rather than time. A second difference between the two models is
that we treat retirement age as endogenous: we believe that a thorough understanding of all
the incentives embedded in social security systems entails considering the retirement deci-
sion as a choice variable.




y,t denotes savings, wn,t ￿ (1 – ˄
ss
t )wt denotes the net of social security contribution
wage rate per efficient unit, ˄
ss
t denotes the social security contribution rate (i.e. the pay-roll
tax rate), and wt denotes the wage rate per efficient unit7.
The second period budget constraint is given by
[4]
where wn,t+1 ￿ (1 – ˄
ss
t+1)wt+1, rt+1 denotes the interest rate between periods t and t +1, b
i
t+1
stands for the social security retirement pension benefit (per unit of time), and sst+1 denotes
the lump-sum transfer that old individuals receive as a result of sharing the difference be-
tween social security contributions minus retirement pension payments8. Given the redistrib-
utive role played by social security, where income is mainly transferred from the young
(workers) to the old, we assume that the difference between contributions and pensions in
our model is transferred to individuals in their second period. Note that both the pension ben-
efit and the labor income that the individual is paid in his/her second period are convenient-
ly weighted by leisure time and labor time, ￿
i
t+1 and 1 – ￿
i
t+1, respectively9.
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13 Social security, education, retirement and growthAs for the retirement pension, two cases must be considered in turn: i) retirees whose
pension benefit is the result of applying a replacement rate ˄
rep
t+1 to past earnings and either a
before-normal-age-retirement penalty, qi, or an after-normal-age retirement incentive, ʦi;
and ii) retirees who, otherwise, would be receiving a too low pension under the previous
scheme, and who are paid a minimum pension, b
min
t+1. Thus, this second type of retirees’ pen-
sion benefit becomes earnings-unrelated10. Formally, retirement pension for an i-th type in-
dividual at time t +1 is given by11
[5]
Concerning the first case, we assume that the replacement rate applies to the average
labor income obtained during the first active periods. If the economy grew at a non-zero
per capita rate, for a balanced growth path to exist, pension benefits should grow at the
same rate at which per capita variables grow. Concerning Eq. (5) two remarks are in order.
Firstly, we assume that the before-normal-age retirement penalty and the after-normal-age
retirement incentive only apply to individuals whose retirement pensions are earnings-re-





where α1 ￿ (1 – α0) / (￿
U – ￿
N), α0 ∈ (0,1), ￿
N ∈ (￿
L,￿
U), denoting the leisure corresponding
to the normal-retirement-age. Thus, a worker retiring at the minimum retirement age (so that
￿ = ￿
U) would be paid a fraction q = α0 of the pension that he/she would obtain, otherwise,
if he/she retired at or after normal retirement age (i.e. if ￿ ≤ ￿
N). Additionally, for an early
retirement penalty rate per year, ˀ, one has that α0 is given by
[7]
where RN and Rmin denote normal retirement age and minimum retirement age, respective-
ly12. Thirdly, in order to evaluate the social security reforms implemented after 2004, we will
consider the late-retirement-age incentives. In particular, we assume that the incentive ʦi is




























































































14 CRUZ A. ECHEVARRￍA AND AMAIA IZAThus, assuming away borrowing constraints, the problem that an i-th type individual
















U. For the sake of clarity, the set of first order necessary conditions for this prob-





t+1), which is equivalent to that one that maximizes the difference between the sum
of the discounted value of first and second period earnings (pension benefits included),









t+1. The optimal values for all choice variables are obtained, of course, by
solving all the conditions simultaneously14.
• Optimal education and retirement pension. The optimal solution for education ex-
penditure depends on whether the retirement pension that the retiree gets paid is earn-
ings-related or not. Thus, it can be shown that if the pension benefit does depend on
the labor income that the individual obtained when he/she was a worker, the optimal








tAt, respectively, where ʻt ￿ (At+1 – At) / At, i.e. the growth
rate of the total factor productivity, and Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1
15. As expected, and along bal-
anced growth paths, e1,t(ʸi) grows over time with At and depends positively on the net
wage rates per efficiency unit and the pension replacement rate. A higher discount
factor reduces the discounted value of retirement pensions and second period labor
income, so that it reduces the incentive to invest in education or human capital. Last
but not least, e1,t(ʸi) depends positively on ʸi: more skilled individuals enjoy a high-
er return on their investment in education and, consequently, are expected to spend
more on education. This is a well known result in human capital literature. (See Le
Garrec, 2005 and references there in.) Later we characterize the range of values of ʸ
for which optimal education is given by (9).
The existence of a minimum retirement pension, however, might break the link be-
tween education expenditure and retirement pension benefits. Individuals with a skill
level below some lower bound ʸ –t might find it optimal to get paid just the minimum
pension and invest in education accordingly (i.e. less). In this case, it can be shown
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15 Social security, education, retirement and growthof a minimum pension may reduce the incentives of low skill individuals to invest in
human capital acquisition. Note also that e2,t(ʸi) is increasing in ʸi. Therefore, a lower
bound for the skill parameter must exist. Once ʸi ≥ ʸ –t, the retirement pension becomes
earnings-related. Taking into account that [given the utility function in Eq. (1)] opti-
mal ￿
i
t+1 is strictly positive, ʸ –t is implicitly given by ʦiqi˄
rep
t+1wtht(ʸ –t)At = b
min
t+1.
For the sake of completeness, Figure 1 shows how optimal education and pension
payment are related to ʸi and where a discontinuity of ei at ʸ = ʸ – shows up: starting
at a low ʸ, when the learning ability parameter equals ʸ –, education expenditure jumps
upwards16.
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• The other optimal decisions: consumption, savings and leisure. The rest of first































































































































t is given by Eq. (2) and, of course, the optimal e
i
t will in general depend on
￿
i
t+1, plus the first and second period budget constraints in Eqs. (3) and (4) respective-
ly. The interpretations of Eqs. (11) and (12) are the usual ones. Eq. (13) represents
how the choice of the retirement age affects the pension payment.
2.2. Aggregate labor force
We assume an exogenous, constant population growth rate n ≥ 0, so that the proportions
of young and old individuals are given by ﾵy = (1+n)/(2+n), and ﾵo = 1/(1+n), respectively.
Additionally, we assume that the exogenous distribution of skills among the population is
such that the proportion of individuals of type i is given by{ˈi}
4
i=1 ≥ 0, where ∑
4
i=1ˈi￿ 1. De-
noting by Pt the total population at time t, aggregate labor force supply is given by
[14]
The first term on the right-hand-side of Eq. (14) represents the labor force of young in-
dividuals, and the second term stands for the labor force of old individuals. In this latter case
the retirement decision is crucial.
2.3. Social security
The social security budget equation at any time t is given by
[15]
where the left-hand-side represents total revenue, and the right-hand-side denotes total ex-
penditure on retirement pensions plus lump-sum transfers. Both social security revenues and
payments on retirement pensions depend on i) the age structure of the population, ii) the dis-
tribution of skill levels, and iii) (as in the case of the aggregate labor force) the distribution
of retirement ages across old individuals.
2.4. Firms
Regarding the production sector, we assume the existence of a representative, competi-
tive firm which produces one unique output, Yt, out of physical capital, Kt, and human cap-
ital in efficiency units, AtLt, and which maximizes current profits. Formally, assuming Cobb-
Douglas production technology, it faces the following problem
[16] max ,
, KL tt t t t t t t
tt
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17 Social security, education, retirement and growthwhere Z > 0 is a scaling factor of the technology level, α ∈ (0,1) denotes the elasticity of output
with respect to physical capital, and ʴ ∈ (0,1) stands for the physical capital depreciation rate.
The productivity of the labor force here depends on two independent factors: i) the state
of knowledge of the economy, At, and ii) the individuals’ human capital level17, h
i
t, which in
turn depends on ii.1) their innate ability, ʸi, and ii.2) their investment in education, e
i
t, which
allows individuals to increase their human capital level above their innate ability.
The first order necessary (and sufficient) conditions for the problem in Eq. (16) give us
the factor price equations
[17]
where kt ≡ Kt/ (AtLt), i.e. the stock of physical capital per efficient unit of labor.
2.5. Goods market equilibrium
As in Diamond (1965), the condition for equilibrium in the goods market states that the
aggregate savings of the young generation at any time t must equal the stock of physical cap-
ital installed in the economy at time t +1. Formally, and denoting type-i young individual’s
savings by s
i
y,t, we have that
[18]
2.6. Growth
We assume that the growth rate at time t of the total factor productivity, At, is given by
[19]
for some ˁ > 0. Thus, we are assuming that growth is a by-product of the young cleverest or
type-4 agents’ individual human capital, h
4
t. Note that Eq. (19) implies that this growth
model is not of vintage type. It is an analogous specification to the one in BDD with two dif-
ferences: i) we assume heterogeneity of innate abilities, and ii) we allow for different tech-
nologies for individual and social human capital accumulation. A similar specification to
that in Eq. (19) has been used by Caucutt et al. (2003) where growth is a by-product (an ex-
ternality) of hiring skilled workers. Once the model is set up, we solve the equilibrium for
this economy. In order to do so, some (quantity) variables must be first redefined relative to
efficiency units so that all these redefined variables remain constant on a balanced growth
path. We have normalized the individual variables by the total factor productivity, At, [which















18 CRUZ A. ECHEVARRￍA AND AMAIA IZAon a balanced growth path grows at a constant rate equal to ʻ] and the aggregate variables
by the aggregate labor force in efficiency units, AtLt, [which also grows at a constant rate (1
+ ʻ)(1 + n) − 1 on a balanced growth path]. The stationary steady state equilibrium can be
solved as a system of simultaneous nonlinear equations with the help of some numerical
techniques18. (See Appendix A.)
As a by-product, our model allows us to study the redistributional role played by the so-
cial security and its eventual conflict with individual incentives to labor supply, retirement
and economic growth. We focus on one particular measure of (in)equality such as Gini’s
index relative to the sum of discounted life-time net income,
which we denote by IG.
3. A numerical example
3.1. Calibration
The non-linearity of the model and the number of equations involved (in spite of its sim-
ple dynamic structure) prevent us from obtaining analytical results for the solution to the in-
dividual problem, let alone for the general equilibrium problem, so that uniqueness must be
assumed. Therefore, we have to rely on numerical analysis for which we need some basic val-
ues for preferences, technology, demographics and social security policy. Our aim when
choosing values is simply to illustrate qualitatively the working and the main features of our
model, but approaching to some extent certain observed figures of the Spanish economy in a
base year, 2004, taking into account the Spanish social security policy features in that year.
• Demographics. We assume that each of the two periods in the model represents
about 32.5 years. According to the INE19, and following D￭az-Gim￩nez and D￭az-
Saavedra (2009a,b), we choose the value for the population growth rate to mimic the
observed dependency ratio in 2004, which gives a value for n equal to 0.3.20
• Preferences. As for preferences, the subjective discount factor is set at β = 2.0. This
means that the yearly preference discount factor equals β 1/32.5 = 1.021556, slightly
higher than others found in the literature21. For instance, Conesa and Garriga (1999)
set it at 0.985, and Garriga and Manresa (1999) at 0.987.
The leisure-related parameter in the utility function ʾ is set equal to 0.209. This value
has been chosen so that type-1 individuals choose to retire at the minimum retirement
age, (i.e. at Rmin = 60), and type-2, type-3 and type-4 individuals choose to retire
around normal retirement age (i.e. at RN = 65), (64.7, 64.8 and 65.0, respectively)22.
Jim￩nez-Mart￭n and S￡nchez-Mart￭n (2007) and Ant￳n et al. (2007) show that retire-
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L and ￿
U, assuming that individuals start solving their maximization prob-
lem at the age of 15 and that their deterministic life expectancy is 80 = 2 ￗ 32.5 +
15, the upper bound ￿
U equals 0.615, which corresponds with a minimum retire-
ment age of 60 years [i.e. ￿
U = (80−60)/32.5]. The lower bound ￿
L is set at 0.308,
thus representing a compulsory retirement age of Rmax = 70 years [i.e. ￿
L =
(80−70)/32.5].
• Heterogeneity of individuals’ innate ability. Concerning the values of innate abili-
ties, we normalize ʸ1 = 1, and we pick up the values for ʸ2, ʸ3 and ʸ4 taking into ac-
count that the higher the innate ability, the higher the educational attainment. In short,
we make a one-to-one correspondence between individuals’ innate abilities and their
educational attainments. We set ʸ2 so that the ratio of type-2 workers’ hourly wage
rate to that of type-1 workers fairly replicates the observed ratio of the annual earn-
ings of workers with primary education to that of workers earning the minimum legal
wage (annual earnings) (i.e., that we are assuming that annual hours are the same for
all workers). In particular, in Spain in 200223, this ratio equals 2.25, and ʸ2 is set equal
to 2.0807. Concerning the value for ʸ3 we choose its value such that the ratio of
hourly wage rate of type-3 workers’ to that of hourly wage rate of type-2 workers is
equal to 1.38, and ʸ3 is set equal to 2.776. Analogously, to set ʸ4 we consider that the
ratio of the hourly wage rate of workers with college education to that of workers with
high school education is the same as the observed ratio. This value was equal to 1.52
in Spain in 2002, and ʸ4 is set equal to 4.0387 Furthermore, this way we are able to
obtain in our benchmark case i) the two types of pension benefits: minimum, for type-
1 individuals, and earnings-related, for type-2, type-3 and type-4 individuals; and ii)
the two types of education expenditure: e2, for type-1 individuals, and e1, for type-2,
type-3 and type-4 individuals.
As for the distribution of the skill parameter, we assume a constant intra-genera-
tional distribution that mimics the observed distribution of the workers regarding
their retirement age and pension benefits. We use the projections of the educa-
tional distribution provided by D￭az-Gim￩nez and D￭az-Saavedra (2009a,b),
which follow Messeguer (2001)’s projections, to obtain the educational distribu-
tion of working-age population in Spain in 2004. In particular, we choose the
value for ˈ1 so that the proportion of retirees receiving the minimum pension is
close to the observed value24. Thus, we assume that ˈ1 = 0.2784. The value for
ˈ2 = 0.3094 is chosen as the difference between the proportions of workers with
primary education and those pensioners receiving the minimum pension. The pro-
portion of working-age population with high school, which is equal to the propor-
tion of type-3 individuals, is ˈ3 = 0.26. Trivially, the value for ˈ4 is equal to 1.0
− ˈ1 − ˈ2 − ˈ3 that mimics the proportion of working-age individuals with col-
lege in Spain in 2004. Finally, as regards human capital production, we assume
that γ = 0.35.25
• Social security system. We assume that b ǆmin = 0.095. The minimum pension is cho-
sen to capture that the minimum pension received by type-1 individuals is approxi-
mately equal to their hourly wage rate. In Spain, the minimum pension is around
100% the minimum wage. In our model, type-1 individuals receive the minimum
20 CRUZ A. ECHEVARRￍA AND AMAIA IZAwage26. Jim￩nez-Mart￭n and S￡nchez-Mart￭n (2007) mentions that 70% of workers
retiring at 60 are low-income workers who receive the minimum pension. As all type-
1 individuals are homogeneous in our model, we obtain that all type-1 individuals re-
ceive the same (the minimum) pension.
We set ˄ ss = 0.283 thus equating the observed value27. We do not consider sources of
revenues other than contributions (such as transfers and subsidies, financial asset in-
come or sale of real estate and financial assets).
We assume that for those workers whose pension benefits are earnings-related and
who retire after the normal retirement age, RN, (i.e. at the age interval [65, 70]), their
replacement rate is equal to one. However, there are individuals whose replacement
rate is below one. In particular, those who retire before the normal retirement age and




t), so that the average replacement rate along balanced growth paths is given
by ARR = [(1 + ʻ)/w] ∑
4
i=1
ˈi (b ǆi / h
i).28
Observed replacement rates vary depending on the life experience of workers. For an
average worker, pension represents 81.2% of average earnings29. We obtain a value
equal to 1.07. For the sake of comparison, Conesa and Garriga (1999) obtain 0.72. As
for inequality, the Gini index equals 0.2539.30
Defining the (balanced growth rate) internal rate of return for individual i, IRRi, as
that rate of return for which the sum of discounted values of his/her contributions
equals the sum of discounted values of his/her pension payments, IRRi is given by
[20]
Following Jimeno and Licandro (1999), we adjust the contribution rate ˄ ss by the co-
efficient 0.53, because the expenditure on retirement pensions approximately repre-
sents a 53% share of total contributive pensions.
Remembering 1 period in our model represents 32.5 years, an approximate meas-
ure of the annualized social security internal rate of return for individual i can be
given by irri = (1+IRRi)1/32.5−1. We obtain that irr1 = 4.81%, irr2 = 2.243%, irr3 =
2.241% and irr4 = 2.237%; this yields a weighted average of 2.956%. Jimeno and
Licandro (1999) claim that the observed values range between 3.7% and 5.03% [de-
pending on the number of active (contributed) years, retirement age and life ex-
pectancy]. As expected, the internal rate of return is higher for type-1 individuals
(i.e. those receiving the minimum pension) and lower for type-4 individuals. Be
aware that in this economy, even though the contribution and replacement rates are
constant, the existence of the minimum pensions means that the Social Security
system is progressive.
• The penalty and incentive parameters. As for α0 and α1 in the penalty function,
Eqs. (6)-(7), setting normal retirement age, RN, equal to 65, and minimum retirement
age, Rmin, equal to 60, and an 8% penalty per year of advanced retirement, ˀ, makes
α0= 0.6. On the other hand, remembering, once more, our period convention and that
individuals are assumed to become optimizing agents at 15, ￿
N = 1−(RN −47.5)/32.5
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21 Social security, education, retirement and growth= 0.462. As a result of the values assigned to α0 , ￿
U and ￿
N, one obtains that α1 =
2.6. As for α2, the extra pension payment for remaining in the labor force after reach-
ing the normal-retirement-age, this is set to 0.0.
• Production technology parameters. Concerning production technology, the partici-
pation of capital income in total income is set equal to α = 0.375, as in Conesa and
Garriga (1999). The depreciation rate of physical capital is set at δ = 1−(1 − 0.045)32.5
= 0.778, as in Conesa and Kehoe (2004). The scaling factor Z is set at 1.00.
• Growth. Finally, with respect to the growth parameter, we assume ˁ = 0.376. We are
therefore able to replicate the observed yearly per capita growth rate of 0.02 [what
implies that ʻ = (1+0.02)32.5−1 = 0.903].
Table 1 summarizes the parameters calibrated for the benchmark case, and compares
simulated and observed values for the magnitudes calibrated. Table 2 summarizes those pa-
rameters not calibrated.
Table 1
BENCHMARK CASE: PARAMETERS CALIBRATED31,32
Parameter Value Target Variable Target Value Model Value
Sample size n 0.300 (ret/act)a 0.25 0.25
Preferences ʾ 0.2090 [R1,R2,R3,R4]b [60,65,65,65] [60,64.7,64.8,65]
Ability ʸ2 2.0807 (wh2 / wh1)c 2.25 2.25
ʸ3 2.7760 (wh3 / wh2)d 1.38 1.38













Social Security b ǆmin 0.095 b ǆmin/ (wh1) [0.85,1.14] 0.95
α0 0.600 α0 0.600 0.600
α1 2.600 ˀ 0.08 0.08







Growth ˁ 0.164 ʻ
i
annual 0.02 0.02
The calibrated structural parameters in col. 2 are those introduced in the text. Col. 3: values assigned to such pa-
rameters. Col. 4: targeted variable. Col. 5: targeted value in the benchmark economy (i.e. year 2004) and, finally,
Col. 6: simulated value in the model economy.
a: ratio of population older than 65 to working age population.
b: type-i individual’s optimal retirement age.
c: ratio of the gross hourly wage rate of type-2 individuals to that of type-1 individuals, the latter assumed to be
paid the minimum wage;
d: ratio of the gross hourly wage rate of type- j individuals to that of type-i individuals, for j = 3, 4 and i = 2, 3;
e: proportion of retirees who are paid the minimum pension;
f: proportion of retirees with primary school educational attainment and pension above the minimum;
g: proportion of retirees with secondary school educational attainment, and
h: proportion of retirees with college educational attainment.
i: ʻ annual: annualized per capita GDP growth rate.
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We perform some numerical exercises to see what our theoretical model predicts about
the response of the economy (in terms of incentives of human capital investment and early
retirement) upon reductions in the minimum pension. Given the social security budget bal-
ance constraint in Eq. (15), whenever the minimum pension is reduced, the difference be-
tween social security contributions and retirement pensions, ss, is conveniently adjusted
while the social security contribution rate is kept constant at the benchmark case value33. Re-
sults are summarized in table 3.
Four caveats concerning the way in which we present our results are in order. Firstly, we
have evaluated the effects of any decrease in the minimum pension assuming that 1) the new
minimum retirement age is 63 years old, 2) the new normal retirement age is 67 years old,
and that 3) the premium for each extra year working after the normal retirement age is 3%,
as these are new social security policies either already implemented after the benchmark
year, or projected to be implemented in the near future34. Secondly, we evaluate the individ-
ual and aggregate effects of decreasing the minimum pension under two scenarios: assum-
ing that the educational distribution of the working-age population and the dependency ratio
remain at their initial value in the benchmark balanced growth path [scenario 1]; and, alter-
natively, that these are close to those expected values in a hypothetical new balanced growth
path [scenario 2].
The figures for the latter scenario are taken from D￭az-Gim￩nez and D￭az-Saavedra
(2009a, 2009b) who use the projections in Messeguer (2001). In particular, they consider
that the educational distribution in Spain will converge to a new steady state by, approxi-
mately, 2050. This new educational distribution will be given by: ˈ1
NBGP = 0.1800, ˈ2
NBGP =
0.20, ˈ3
NBGP = 0.38 and ˈ4
NBGP = 0.24. In order to obtain ˈ1
NBGP and ˈ2
NBGP, we have assumed
that the ratio ˈ1 / (ˈ1 + ˈ2) remains constant across both balanced growth paths, as the pro-
jections in Messeguer provide figures for the sum of ˈ1 + ˈ2. The new value set for n is
equal to zero, which gives a dependency ratio higher than in 2004, but lower than the one
expected for 2050, as the expected population growth rate for that year is negative (which is
not compatible with the existence of a balanced growth path).
23 Social security, education, retirement and growthThirdly, as we have pointed out above, some reforms have already been implemented
since 2004 because they are part of the projected reform for 2011 (the delay in the normal
retirement age, the increase in the minimum retirement age [fully effective in 2027] and the
3% bonus). Consequently, before starting with the analysis of the effect of reducing the min-
imum pension, we analyze what our model would predict about the new balanced growth
path if no more reforms took place. And afterwards, we look at what our model would pre-
dict if, additionally, reductions in the minimum pension were also set in place.
Fourthly, we distinguish between partial and general equilibrium effects. The general
equilibrium effects will come from two sources. On the one hand (even in the absence of any
change in the minimum pension), the changes in the minimum legal and normal retirement
ages and in the late-retirement incentive will make pension expenditures decrease and con-
tributions increase. This will be the case since workers will end up retiring later. Conse-
quently, ss (which we will refer to as the social security surplus in the sequel) will rise, there-
by making individuals’ second period income higher what, in turn, decreases savings. On the
other hand, pension payments for type-2, type-3 and type-4 workers remain earnings-relat-
ed. As we will see, penalties for early retirement will be higher for those individuals (despite
postponing retirement!). Therefore, these individuals will have incentives to increase their
savings. We will see that net effect on young individuals’ savings (and k and factor prices),
will critically depend on the educational distribution. Thus, for the n and ˈ’s in the initial
balanced growth path, it turns out that k is predicted to fall; while for those in the expected
new balanced growth path, k is predicted to rise, as the proportions of type-3 and type-4 in-
dividuals go higher.
As already mentioned above, we first analyze the individual and aggregate effects of the
new minimum legal and normal retirement ages and the new premium for late retirement
without any change in the minimum pension whatsoever, because these reforms have already
been implemented after 2004. And, next, we analyze the additional effects of changes in the
minimum pension. In both cases, we evaluate such effects under the two above mentioned
scenarios. Results are shown in table 3.
• New balanced growth path with reforms already implemented after 2004. Sce-
nario 1: Initial educational distribution and dependency ratio. (See table 3, column
4) Type-1 individuals respond by retiring at the new minimum legal retirement age,
so that their incentive to education increases. Type 2 to 4 individuals end up retiring
later than in the benchmark economy, but quite before the new normal retirement age.
Even though type-1 individuals’ education investment rises, their internal rate or re-
turn falls as so does their retirement length. Concerning type 2 to 4 individuals, the
response of their education investment and internal rate of return are (mainly) ex-
plained by general equilibrium effects. As mentioned above, the resulting higher so-
cial security surplus (lump-sum distributed to old age individuals) causes individual-
s’ first period savings decrease. But, at the same time, type 2 to 4 individuals increase
their first period savings as pension payments are earnings-related and their penalties
for early retirement rise. As it turns out, the net effect on k is negative, so that both
24 CRUZ A. ECHEVARRￍA AND AMAIA IZAthe net wage rate and the discount factor get lower, thereby decreasing the incentives
to education investment. (See Eqs. (9) and (10).) This implies a negative effect on the
ê’s, for all type of workers except for type-1 individuals, for which the mentioned
above partial effect dominates. The internal rates or return for type 2 to 4 individuals
decrease more than for type-1 individuals. This is so because pension payments for
type 2 to 4 are lower (retirement pensions are earnings-related, labor income falls,
penalties for early retirement are higher and, finally, pension payments are more
heavily discounted). As for type-1 individuals, however, they receive the same (min-
imum) pension, but for a shorter time span. Income inequality decreases relative to
the benchmark case. Labor income rises for type-1 individuals, since their education
investment rises, but their pension benefits remain constant. However, for the rest of
individuals, education investment becomes lower and so do their labor incomes and
pension payments. Therefore, the dispersion of labor earnings (pensions interpreted
as deferred labor earnings) is necessarily reduced. Finally, the fall in type-4 individ-
uals’ education fully explains the fall in the growth rate per capita output.
Scenario 2: New educational distribution and dependency ratio. (See table 3, column
8) Type-1 individuals retire at the new minimum legal retirement age, of course. Con-
cerning the rest of individuals, they retire later than in the benchmark economy, as
expected, and slightly later than in scenario 1, but, once again, before the new normal
retirement age. Comparing results with those in scenario 1, type-1 individuals in-
crease their educational investment in a much higher proportion. This is so because
the general equilibrium effect now reinforces the positive partial effect. The final ex-
planation comes from the fact that with a higher proportion of qualified workers in
scenario 2, the net effect on k is positive now, thereby increasing the education in-
vestment incentives for all types of workers. Concerning the internal rates of return,
the falls for type 2 to 4 individuals are similar to those in the scenario 1. The decrease
in the internal rate for type-1 individuals now is higher: even though the same pen-
sion payment is less discounted, social security contributions are higher as wages are
also higher due to the positive effect on k. As for the income inequality, this falls
more than in the first scenario, because the proportions of lower income individuals
(ʸ1 and ʸ2) fall and, of course, the proportions of higher income individuals (ʸ3 and
ʸ4) rise. Lastly, the increment in type-4 individuals’ education explains the predicted
increment in per capita growth.
• Reductions in minimum pension. Scenario 1: Initial educational distribution and
dependency ratio. Consider, firstly, reductions in the minimum pension so that type-
1 workers still find it optimal to retire at the (new) minimum legal retirement age, and
(of course) be paid the minimum pension. In particular, when minimum pension
drops 10.0% or 15.0%. (See table 3, columns 5 and 6). This policy reform affects di-
rectly type-1 individuals. The (quite similar) predicted increment in these individual-
s’ educational investment is explained the same way as above. Concerning general
equilibrium effects, there is an additional source stemming from the reductions in
b ǆ min. On the one hand, social security pension expenses are reduced and, consequent-
ly, the social security surplus must increase more (See how ∆rest is higher for high-
er b ǆ min drops along last row in table 3), thereby decreasing savings. But, on the other
25 Social security, education, retirement and growthhand, the minimum pension received by type-1 individuals is lower, what makes
them increase their savings. In sum, type-1 individuals are experiencing two opposite
sign equilibrium effects: as we move in table 3 from column 4 to 6, the decrement in
k is lower35. Consequently, the fall in incentives to education investment will be lower
too, which implies a lower negative effect on the ê’s for all types of workers. There-
fore, the increase in the education investment for type-1 workers is higher than with
no reductions in the minimum pension, and the decrease for the rest of individuals is
lower. Regarding the internal rate or return, the one for type-1 individuals drops more
as the reductions of the minimum pension are larger. For type 2 to 4 individuals, as
expected, their return rates are hardly affected by drops in the minimum pension. The
inequality index decreases less as the minimum pension is reducing. This seemingly
counterintuitive result, however, has a neat explanation: despite minimum pensions
fall, type-1 individuals increase their human capital investment so that their labor in-
comes are higher.
Consider, secondly, reductions in the minimum pension so that type-1 workers do not
find it optimal to retire at the minimum retirement age any more. Once the minimum
pension is not binding, the reform would be equivalent to one in which the minimum
pension is removed. Therefore, we evaluate the effect of eliminating the minimum
pension (See table 3, column 7). Needless to say, type-1 individuals are by far the
most affected. A sharp increase in ê1 shows up: the minimum pension disappears and
the pension payment becomes earnings-related; once this happens, the returns to (the
incentives of) education investment and the incentive to postpone retirement rise. For
the rest of individuals, the retirement age decision does not change, and the education
investment decreases more than in the case of no reductions in the minimum pension.
This is so because the social security surplus becomes larger, thereby inducing the by
now familiar (negative) general equilibrium effects on savings, capital per worker
and factor prices. Additionally, the income inequality “decreases” less than in the
case that the reductions in the minimum pension remain binding for type-1 individu-
als, of course: type-1 individuals greatly increase not only their labor incomes, but
also their (now) earnings-related pension benefits; and, moreover, type 2 to 4 individ-
uals’ productivities and labor incomes decrease in a higher magnitude. Finally, since
growth is determined as a by-product of type-4 workers’ productivity, growth de-
creases more as the minimum pension disappears.
Scenario 2: New educational distribution and dependency ratio. As in the case with
the initial educational distribution and dependency ratio, we might firstly consider re-
ductions in the minimum pension such that type-1 workers would still retire at the
minimum retirement age and, accordingly, be paid the minimum pension (See table
3, columns 9 and 10) and, next, further reductions in b ǆ min such that type-1 individu-
als would start retiring after the minimum legal retirement age, their pensions becom-
ing earnings-related (See table 3, column 11). However, once we have thoroughly an-
alyzed i) the specific effects induced by the change in educational distribution and
dependency ratio, and ii) the effects stemming from the reduction on the minimum
pensions (even its elimination) in the benchmark case, the arguments used to explain
the results would be completely redundant, so they will not be repeated here.
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COMPARE STATICS RESULTS
Predicted NBGP (Secenario 1) Predicted NBGP (Secenario 2)
∆ ∆b ˆmin ∆ ∆b ˆmin
Benchmark 0% –10% –15% –100% 0% –10% –15% –100%
R
1 60.6 R
1 63.0 63.0 63.0 64.6 63.0 63.0 63.0 65.2
R
2 64.7 R
2 65.2 65.2 65.2 65.2 65.8 65.8 65.8 65.8
R
3 64.8 R
3 65.4 65.4 65.4 65.4 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.9
R
4 65.0 R
4 65.5 65.5 65.5 65.5 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1
ê
1 0.005 ∆ê
1 2.84 2.89 2.92 16.98 17.83 17.87 17.88 37.11
ê
2 0.020 ∆ê
2 –2.47 –2.42 –2.40 –2.74 14.31 14.34 14.36 13.97
ê
3 0.032 ∆ê
3 –2.44 –2.39 –2.37 –2.70 14.34 14.38 14.40 14.01
ê
4 0.056 ∆ê
4 –2.41 –2.36 –2.34 –2.66 14.38 14.41 14.43 14.05
irr
1 4.811 ∆irr
1 –15.62 –24.50 –29.41 –71.64 –21.74 –30.78 –35.80 –71.51
irr
2 2.243 ∆irr
2 –38.24 –38.25 –38.25 –38.26 –39.00 –39.00 –39.00 –38.97
irr
3 2.241 ∆irr
3 –38.11 –38.12 –38.12 –38.11 –39.12 –39.12 –39.12 –39.09
irr
4 2.237 ∆irr
4 –38.02 –38.02 –38.02 –38.00 –39.30 –39.31 –39.31 –39.26
ʻannual 0.02 ∆ʻannual –0.17 –0.17 –0.16 –0.19 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.94
IG 0.25 ∆IG –1.33 –0.90 –0.68 –0.24 –12.42 –12.16 –12.02 –12.06
k 0.012 ∆k –1.53 –1.46 –1.42 –1.82 19.28 19.33 19.35 18.89
rest 0.008 ∆rest 17.31 18.93 19.73 24.72 14.89 15.93 16.45 19.24
∆x: % change in x, where x stands for, b ǆ min, ê
i, ʻ, k, irr
i, and IG. Columns 4-7 (resp. 8-11) show the results under
the assumption that the distribution of the working-age population by education and the proportion of retirees with
respect to the working-age population remain at their benchmark value in 2004 (resp. the expected for 2050).
4.  Conclusions and final remarks
This paper has analyzed the expected effects of changes in the Spanish social security
system that have been implemented after 2004 and, additionally, reductions in the minimum
pension. We have built a two-period, OLG economy populated by ex-ante heterogeneous in-
dividuals, who differ in their innate ability and decide endogenously their retirement age and
their human capital investment, which, in turn, will affect their productivity in the labor mar-
ket. In this economy, endogenous growth is a by-product of most skilled workers’ produc-
tivity. We take into account some of the specific features of the Spanish social security sys-
tem such as that pension payments are earnings-related, that there is a minimum pension and
that early retirement is penalized and late retirement promoted.
Given that pension payments are earnings-related, when individuals choose their optimal
level of education, they take into account not only the effect on future labor earnings, but also
on future pension benefits. Consequently, social security introduces an incentive for higher in-
vestment in human capital. This incentive, however, partly breaks down due to the minimum
pensions. Individuals’ secondperiod labor supply is elastic. Therefore, the voluntary retirement
age depends on the incentives embedded in the public pension system: not only minimum pen-
sions, but also penalties for early retirement (and incentives for late retirement).
27 Social security, education, retirement and growthWe have calibrated the model and constructed a benchmark case which fairly reproduces
some stylized facts of the Spanish economy in 2004. Starting from this baseline case, first-
ly, we solve for a new balanced growth path economy taking into account social security
policies which are currently in place in the Spanish economy or projected to be implement-
ed in the near future (higher minimum and normal retirement ages). And, secondly, we an-
alyze the effects of reductions in the minimum retirement pension benefits.
When presenting our results, we have distinguished partial equilibrium effects (those ex-
erted on a particular type of individuals in a direct manner) from general equilibrium effects
(those exerted on all individuals induced by changes in the social security surplus which, in
turn, induces changes in aggregate private savings and factor prices).
We conclude that increases in the minimum and normal retirement ages, which have start-
ed to be implemented in 2011, are expected to have a strong effect, not only on individuals’ re-
tirement decisions, but also on their education investment in the resulting new balanced growth
path. However, reductions in the minimum pension are not expected to have a significant effect
unless it is completely eliminated. And, of course, policies enhancing human capital investment
for the cleverest workers increase growth as a by-product of these workers’ productivity.
Finally, one of the assumptions upon which we build our model is that all individuals
enter the labor market at the same age, i.e. regardless of their educational attainment. This is
so because education in our model is not made out of time. In that case, education would also
represent an opportunity cost in which more skilled workers would be willing to incur more.
In that setup one would expect that, as in our economy, more skilled workers making a high-
er educational investment would also react by postponing their retirement, without an ￠ pri-
ori clear net effect on the working lives. The existing empirical evidence on the relationships
between educational attainment, entry age into the labor market and retirement suggests pos-
itive relationships between the first two, and a negative relationship between educational
level and the length of working lives. (See Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2005). We believe that
our results are fairly robust to this assumption, because the predicted retirement age for more
skilled individuals hardly exceeds that for less skilled individuals, except for type-1 individ-
uals when they are paid the minimum pension.
5.  Appendix A
5.1.  Solution to households’ problem
• Optimal education and retirement pension. If the pension benefit depends on the labor
income that the individual obtained when he/she was a worker, the first order necessary
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28 CRUZ A. ECHEVARRￍA AND AMAIA IZADifferentiating NPV1 (e
i
t) with respect to e
i
t, taking into account Eq. (2), equating to 0 and
solving that equation for e
i
t yields the solution for education expenditure36
where ʻt ￿ (At+1 – At) / At.
If the pension benefit does not depend on the labor income that the individual obtained
when he/she was a worker, however, the first order necessary condition comes from solv-
ing the following problem
Differentiating NPV2 (e
i
t) with respect e
i
t to [again, taking into account Eq. (2)], equating
to 0 and solving for the first-order-necessary (and sufficient) condition for e
i
t yields the
solution for education expenditure
• The other optimal decisions: consumption, savings and leisure. From Eqs. (3) and (4)
we obtain the intertemporal budget constraint
[A.1]






t+1, subject to Eqs. (5), (6), (8) and
(A.1), and using Eq. (3), yields the following system of non-linear equations which [along
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29 Social security, education, retirement and growth5.2.  Steady state competitive equilibrium
The steady state competitive equilibrium is characterized by the following equations.
From Eq. (6) and the definition of ʸ –, we obtain:
where wn ≡ (1 – ˄
ss)w.
From Eq. (17), we obtain w = (1 – α)Zka and r + δ = αZkα-1
From Eqs. (2)-(19), we obtain
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1. See, e.g. D￭az-Gim￩nez & D￭az-Saavedra (2009).
2. We assume that fertility and mortality are exogenous and that households are not altruistic. Thus, we do not
follow the literature which assumes that parents care about the number of children and their well being and
where parents invest in their children’s human capital. (See, e.g., Zhang & Zhang, 2004).
3. We could also consider the disincentive in human capital investment arising from the existence of a maximum
retirement pension payment. However, we do not do so because the proportion of households affected by the
maximum retirement pension hardly represents a 0.02% of retirement pensions in 2004, our benchmark year.
See Informe Estad￭stico 2004, INSS, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Cuadro 7.26, p. 244, for the
distribution of retirement pensions in 2004, and Seguridad Social, Presupuestos, Ejercicio 2011, Anexo al In-
forme Econ￳mico-Financiero, Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigraci￳n, Secretar￭a de Estado de la Seguridad So-
cial, Cuadro II.2.3, p. 78, for the maximum retirement pension in 2004.
4. In this model one period represents 32.5 years. Assuming that individuals start their active life when they are
15 years old, the maximum amount of leisure depends on the minimum retirement age. For instance, in the U.S.
it may be 0.77 (i.e. some individuals can retire at 55). See http://www.opm.gov/fers_election/fersh/h_fers3.htm
for minimum retirement age (US Federal Employees Retirement Service).
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31 Social security, education, retirement and growth5. Huggett et al. (2006), referring to the US economy, claim that “differences in learning ability account for the
bulk of the variation in the present value of earnings across agents.”
6. No distinction is made between “retirement age” and “pension age”.
7. All individuals in their first period of life enter the labor market at the same time, i.e. regardless of the educa-
tion expenditure made. Had we assumed a different time setting in our model, we could have assigned differ-
ent ages for entering the labor market: thus, individuals attaining college education, for instance, would start
working later than, say, those attaining primary school education. This point is left out in this paper.
8. Retirement pensions are not the only type of transfers that social security systems in real economies pay. For
instance, Spanish social security also pays disability, widows’, widowers’ and orphans’ pensions and family
benefits, representing 66.45% of total pensions in 2000-2005. As an alternative, one might consider a unique
consolidated budget for the social security and the government, so that tax rates were adjusted to keep the
budget balanced. (See, e.g. S￡nchez- Mart￭n, 2005.)
9. Alternatively, one may assume that the retirement pension benefit does not depend on whether the individual
is completely or partially retired, so that the pension payment is simply b
i
t+1. (See, e.g., Garriga and Manresa,
1999.)
10. As pointed out above, we assume that there is not a legal maximum retirement pension benefit.
11. ￿
i




12. A similar specification was used by D￭az-Gim￩nez and D￭az-Saavedra (2009a,b).
13. For the sake of emphasizing the economic intuition of the solutions, we break this problem into two separate
cases, depending on whether pension benefits are earnings-related or not.
14. The solution to the households’ problem is obtained in the Appendix A to which the reader is referred for fur-
ther detail.
15. Notice the notation: e1,t (ʸi) denotes the education chosen at time t by an individual of skill level ʸi whose re-
tirement pension benefit is earnings related.
16. Education expenditure increases with learning ability, since the individual labor productivity is an increasing
function of the individual’s learning ability.
17. In a narrow sense, as in Romer (1990).
18. In particular, we have used Matlabﾩ.
19. INE stands for Instituto Nacional de Estad￭stica (Spanish National Institute of Statistics), which can be ac-
cessed at http://www.ine.es
20. More precisely, n has been calculated such that for a deterministic life expectancy at birth of 80, a normal re-
tirement age of 65 and a dependency ratio of 0.25 in 2004 (and under the assumption that one period in this
economy represents 32.5 years), it holds that ((80−65)/32.5)/(1+n+(65−47.5)/32.5) = 0.25.
21. As pointed out elsewhere, a discount factor higher than one (i.e. a negative time preference rate) is not a prob-
lem in OLG economies. (See Ventura, 1999, and Constantinides et al., 2002.)
22. Since 2002, the minimum retirement age is set to 61 years for all workers that entered the labor market after
1967. Consequently, most workers retiring in 2004 were in the labor market before 1967, so that they could
still retire at 60. (See D￭az-Gim￩nez and D￭az-Saavedra, 2009b, and LEY 35/2002, Bolet￭n Oficial del Estado
No. 167, July 13, 2002, p. 25633).
23. These figures have also been obtained from the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Wage Structure Survey),
2002, INE. The Encuesta de Estructura Salarial is only available in 1995 and 2002. We have chosen 2002
since it is the closest year.
24. Since in 2004, 27.84% of General Regime pensioners were receiving the minimum pension, we set ˈ1 =
0.2784.
32 CRUZ A. ECHEVARRￍA AND AMAIA IZA25. In this model, this value does not play an important role as we are not building a concave life-cycle labor in-
come pattern.
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imen General y Reg￭menes Especiales Asimilados (General Regime and Assimilated Special Regimes) since
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29. See OECD (2005), p. 172.
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31. Jim￩nez-Mart￭n & S￡nchez (2007) show that the minimum pension was very similar to the legislated mini-
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32. See Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 2002, p. 3, Instituto Nacional de Estad￭stica.
33. In none of the proposed reforms changes in the pay-roll tax rate have been considered.
34. As pointed out in footnote 28, the increment in the late retirement age stimulus was implemented in the 2008 re-
form. Regarding the delay in the normal retirement age, the increase in the minimum retirement age (fully effective
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35 Social security, education, retirement and growthResumen
Este trabajo analiza, en primer lugar, los efectos esperados de las reformas de la seguridad social que
se han llevado a cabo en Espa￱a despu￩s de 2004 (y, en segundo lugar, los efectos esperados de la re-
ducci￳n de la pensi￳n m￭nima) en la decisi￳n de retiro y en la acumulaci￳n de capital humano (y por
lo tanto en el crecimiento y en la desigualdad de ingresos). Los individuos de nuestra econom￭a difieren
en su capacidad innata, y el crecimiento es un subproducto de la productividad de los individuos m￡s
cualificados. Seg￺n nuestro modelo, i) se espera que los aumentos de las edades de jubilaci￳n m￭nima
y normal tengan un fuerte efecto no s￳lo sobre las decisiones de jubilaci￳n, sino tambi￩n sobre las de
inversi￳n en educaci￳n, ii) no se espera que los incentivos al retraso de la jubilaci￳n tengan ning￺n
efecto, y iii) no se espera que la reducci￳n de la pensi￳n m￭nima tenga un efecto significativo a menos
que se elimine por completo.
Palabras clave: Seguridad Social; Sistema de Reparto; Retiro Voluntario; Capital Humano; Pensi￳n
M￭nima.
Clasificaci￳n JEL: O4, H3
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